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AFTER UTOPIA: WHAT NEXT? 
JACK LAWRENCE LUZKOW 
FONTBONNE UNIVERSITY 
 
topia, however defined, has a long history, but the utopian impulse 
has not always been politically progressive. Hitler‟s Third Reich was 
to be a thousand-year Utopia for racially pure German Aryans. 
Hitler was himself a German nationalist, national-socialist and utopian. He 
took it for granted that German nationalists were true believers in the 
biological community which he defined as the pure German nation. The 
inevitable outcome of this utopian idyll was Auschwitz. Nazi idealism, the 
perfection of the Aryan community, could only be realized with the 
ritualistic slaughter of millions of non-Aryans.    
The idea of utopia has been with us almost since the beginning of 
Western civilization. Plato described Utopia in his Republic; his utopia was to 
be led by an elite of guardians who would have a monopoly of power—
Plato was neither a democrat nor a republican—but as philosopher kings 
they would rule disinterestedly, putting the interests of the citizens ahead of 
any interests of their own. Platonic idealism envisioned a state ruled 
rationally from above. Plato would not have thought of this as totalitarian; 
but none of the ruled were to be consulted, the guardians knew best the 
interests of the whole.  
Thomas More, in the sixteenth century, presented his own version of 
Utopia, a kind of Christian Socialist alternative to the incipient capitalism in 
sixteenth-century England, an England which, he said, took better care of 
its sheep than the English people. More presented an ideal that would 
alleviate human suffering, utopia after all was supposed to be something 
much better than the imperfect present. Reason, education and a slight 
alteration of society could bring about the good life; if everybody worked, 
and shared their production as equals, the entire society could work less and 
yet receive a greater share for less work. More believed that utopia was 
already at hand, he located his utopia—which is often defined as no place 
and outside of time, and therefore not something as attainable—in the 
present, and as eminently possible, although to be safe he located his utopia 
outside of England. Utopia was therefore no longer a distant dream. It was 
in some distant place, but not in a distant future. It was possible because it 
was desirable, and it was already somewhere. 
More‟s real complaint was that the English had been displaced from 
their rightful place in the social cosmos. With just slight ingenuity, by 
restoring the social equality that had been lost, citizens could meet the 
needs of all, and with less effort. Equality meant a restoration of the social 
cosmos that had been lost.  
In the eighteenth-century, Denis Diderot offered a similar utopian 
vision. Modern mankind, he argued, worked hard and had little to show for 
its efforts. The reason was that most labored hard to meet the needs—or 
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not a future utopia that would erase the malfunctions of civilization, his 
vision looked backwards, toward a return to nature. The argument was 
simple: the new science and technology of the eighteenth-century would 
not make humankind happy, it would only enlarge its desires for more. 
Utopia was achievable, but only if people would limit their needs. But it was 
up to the people themselves to limit their consumption. Diderot‟s utopia 
would not come about by directive from the state, but by an inner 
transformation of human beings voluntarily limiting their desires. Utopia 
could be achieved through moral enlightenment, not instruction from 
above.  
Like many of the earlier utopians, Diderot‟s utopian urges were meant 
as a moral yardstick, a manner of judgment of the present, but not as a 
blueprint for social change. Diderot‟s contemporary, Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
introduced a more revolutionary notion of utopia grounded in a social 
contract in his book of the same title, The Social Contract. Rousseau also 
intended a moral regeneration as the basis of Utopia, but now with a 
difference. Rousseau compared the liberty of humankind in a hypothetical 
state of nature to the contemporary reality in which man was everywhere in 
„chains‟. The cause of bondage was clear; it was the institution of private 
property, not property as such but its concentration. Restore human beings 
to the status of social equality and bondage would end. Rousseau did not 
offer a prescription as to how this would happen, but the social contract 
implied the principle of human equality as the basis of social organization; 
and it implied also that citizens were bound to each other and not to a 
higher authority. Not only were people citizens, but they were now, 
collectively, sovereign. To put this in modern language, Rousseau meant 
that citizens had the right—the obligation—to define their own collective 
purposes, and to make them a priority ahead of the vagaries of the 
economic market. Human relationships should not be ordered by the 
chanciness of commercial exchange. Rousseau was not a socialist, but he 
had discovered socialism and anticipated the nineteenth century.  
Today we live in an age of doubt, suspicion of the state and state 
intervention; we prefer the market and call that liberty. We live in an age of 
uncertainty, an age of bankrupt cities, endemic unemployment and 
underemployment, an age of failing and closing schools, an age of the 
underinsured and uninsured, of massive foreclosures, of personal and 
business bankruptcies, of broken highways and collapsing bridges, of gross 
inequality and failed health systems. These social pathologies are pervasive 
and threaten to become enduring. More than ever uncertainty reigns over 
our politics, our economy, our finances, and even our personal health. We 
are fighting invisible wars that we try not to think about and that are fought 
by people many of us rarely if ever meet. Yet we are hardly able to discuss 
what is happening to us, we cannot even imagine the alternatives, for they 
too have become invisible. We live unawares that we did not always live like 
this, that life in the present is not life eternal, and that most of what we 
have today dates only from the 1980‟s: that‟s the decade when incessant 
materialism, the privatization of industry, and the spread of social 
inequalities between rich and poor became endemic.1   
Because we have forgotten the past we can no longer imagine the 
future; if we do, we do not see life improving. The last century, even the 
                                                          
1 Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), 1-2.   
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recent past, is largely invisible, it exists without context, memorialized in 
fragments of the past in museums, theme parks and heritage sites. It is 
enshrined in official memory as nostalgic triumphalism, such as Francis 
Fukuyama‟s infamous declaration praising the end of history and the victory 
of Western idealism and liberal democracy. The twentieth-century as a 
whole is dismissed as a chamber of horrors—from world wars to 
Auschwitz, from the slaughter of Armenians to the genocide in Bosnia—
not to be forgotten because of its crimes and its victims; we prefer to think 
that was then, and this is now; we want to believe that we are better than 
that past which we prefer to inter in official remembrance. We want to 
think that we will be better yet.  
“Worse still,” says Tony Judt, “we encourage citizens and students to 
see the past—and its lessons—through the particular of their own suffering 
(or that of their ancestors).”2 We no longer have a shared understanding of 
the past, or even a shared narrative which we can call the past. Instead, we 
fragment history into particular ethnicities defined by “victimhood.” The 
result is that past and present become inverted; rather than the past helping 
to explain how we got here, we parse out that piece of the past we wish to 
preserve as a record of suffering, or as a memory piece helping us to 
commemorate something in the present. We memorialize, but we do not 
remember. 
What we end up with is the impression that the world of today has no 
provenance in the past, that modernity is its own creation. Modernization 
and globalization help that illusion along by wiping out many remnants of 
the past in the name of progress. Instead of tradition, which was vaunted by 
the generation of my grandparents, and was still observed—making it 
possible to have not only a past, but to continue a shared and common 
narrative which could be shared through observance and remembrance—
we have disconnected fragments of a past whose meaning is increasingly 
lost to us. Moreover, what has been true of individuals is also true of 
nations and societies.  
Francis Fukuyama‟s narrative proclaiming the end of history in The End 
of History and the Last Man had an ironic twist to it. For just as he proclaimed 
the end of the past, and heralded the outcome of the victory of the West, 
many people were forgetting the lessons of the past whose end he was now 
proclaiming and celebrating. To be sure some things needed to end. 
Communism, in its Stalinist and Maoist versions, needed to end, though not 
to be forgotten. The authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe needed to 
end, along with the incredible heaviness of being that they created. What 
needed to end also was the illusion that these regimes had in any sense 
fulfilled the utopian visions that had accompanied their birth. What had 
once been heralded as paradise had long ago sunk into the abyss of the 
gulag: the invasion of Hungary in 1956, the repression of Czechoslovakia in 
1968; and before that the show trials, the infamy of the disappeared. And 
yet, precisely because of the disillusionment which preceded the collapse of 
the Soviet regime, and the ideological baggage that went with it, it was also 
forgotten—or willfully ignored—that there had been good reasons for 
dreaming about Utopia: revolution had been bred by hope, the perpetual 
                                                          
2  Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century 
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 4. 
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desire to transform earlier regimes into imagined communities of publicly 
shared good.   
Unfortunately, and almost imperceptibly, many visions were 
compromised in 1989, brought down by the memories of the gulag and the 
demons of history: the Left, socialism, even social democracy, at least in the 
US and Great Britain, were tainted by their association with the 
authoritarian regimes in the East. The very idea of Utopia seemed to vanish 
from historical memory, and with it vanished the memory of why so many 
had wrestled with the idea of achieving social and political harmony in a 
utopianized future. Two hundred years of experimentation in creating the 
good society based on a defined collective purpose and a collective social 
good as the foundation of human happiness, from the French Revolution 
to the Russian Revolution, evaporated into the memory hole.  
The implication of the end of history, the glib surmise of Fukuyama, 
was that there had been two fundamental choices, we could have either 
liberty, or we could have equality. We could not have both. Put another 
way, we had to choose between either the State or the Market. This was a 
reaction to the imperious authoritarian regimes of the East, and it was also a 
reaction to the nanny—interventionist—states in the West, especially the 
social democracies. Fukuyama‟s assumption that liberal democracy was the 
final end of history, and therefore there was no need to define our common 
social purposes, was also a kind of endism and utopianism.3  
What Fukuyama neglected to say, or refused to believe, was that liberals and 
social democrats were agreed on many principles. Social democrats 
defended cultural and religious tolerance. They embraced democracy, liberty 
and human rights. Social democrats favored, like liberals, progressive 
taxation to pay for public services and other social goods to help individuals 
who could not otherwise provide for themselves. Social democrats differed 
from liberals, however, in social policy. Liberals often saw taxation or 
public provision as a necessary evil; social democrats had a vision of the 
good society and afforded a greater role for the state and the public sector.  
In public policy social democrats believed in the possibility and virtue of 
collective action for the collective good.4   
Today we have inherited the universe anticipated by Fukuyama, 
without the ending of history anticipated by him. Today we have in fact 
seen the victory of the Market in the U. S. and to a great extent in Britain. 
Absent history, and the past, and many think that this is the way things have 
always been. Most cannot imagine a different kind of society despite the 
social maladies and dysfunctions in the one we now have. We do not even 
know how to think about our society, because we think that what exists 
today has always been with us; we suffer from the illusion that 
contemporary institutions are eternal. Even the experts in the media, the 
intellectuals whose discourse seems oblivious to the alternatives once posed 
in past debates and discussions, have succumbed to this logic. Instead of 
having public conversations that question the present and that challenge its 
assumptions—that social inequalities have always been with us and are 
eternal— instead of posing alternatives to assumed eternal and elective 
                                                          
3 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free 
Press, 1992).  
4 Judt, Ill Fares the Land, 5. 
AFTER UTOPIA 
 
Interdisciplinary Journal of the Dedicated Semester  5 
 
affinities, we are always given a diet of „economism,” the priority of 
economics in all discussions of public affairs.5  
In the United States in particular, and in Britain as well, it is as if we 
have always been here. Freedom, we think, has always meant license, and 
especially license to make profits. Freedom is the market unfettered. 
Equality means equality before the law, legal equality, but no more; we have 
abandoned the notion of a public good, or the belief that social equality is 
worth pursuing, or even possible. In the words of E. P. Thompson, we 
celebrate only the equal opportunity to become unequal. More and more we 
have signed on to the belief that we must keep the state at a distance; it is 
expensive, intrusive, and inefficient. That this is partially true is obvious. 
But it is also mostly false.  Almost unnoticed, we have neglected to put the 
public good ahead of private gain, and forgotten the significance of defining 
what the public good is, and setting that as a priority. Above all we must ask 
ourselves why we accept spending trillions on war—which is also managed 
by the state—but resent the spending of sums far less, especially when 
those sums are likely to benefit the vast majority of us. 
The Great Recession has alerted us once again to the dangers of an 
unfettered and unregulated market. The government has once again had to 
intervene to avoid not only a banking and credit collapse, but the possibility 
of an economic depression, and even global recession. After denying 
Keynesian economic policies for decades—the notion that the state must 
regulate the market and massively intervene to maintain employment and 
social investment—public monies in the trillions have been committed in 
stunning policy reversals, taking failed companies under the public wing. 
But nobody is rethinking the state, policy reversals are temporary at best. 
There is no long term intention in the United States or in Britain to regulate 
markets or to reign in the circuits of capital. The result is that one more 
lesson of history has been forgotten: namely, why so many states in the 
interwar period, and especially after WW II, resorted to Keynesianism and 
the use of public spending to benefit public patrimony, and why they were 
largely successful in growing public affluence.   
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, it was accepted 
that the state should be providential, a welfare state, benevolent, 
underwriting needs and minimizing risks. The idea was for the state to be as 
unobtrusive as possible, but universally available to all citizens. But for 
more than two decades it has been increasingly assumed that the state is 
inefficient and should not be intrusive at all. Combined with the fall of 
Communism and the discrediting of the socialist project, and the Left, 
much of the developed world has abandoned the notion of the state as 
public benefactor and accepted the freedoms of the so-called flat world in 
which the corporate world is supposed to satisfy all human needs by 
mobilizing capital, ideas and people between and across borders. It is taken 
as self-evident that privatization is the antidote to the intrusiveness of the 
state.6   
But overall the state does some things rather well and we need to return 
to the model used in Europe. The Welfare State was actually born of 
consensus, and was more the product of reformist liberalism in the late 
                                                          
5 Tony Judt, “What is Living and What is Dead in Social Democracy” in The 
New York Review of Books LVI, no. 20 (December 17, 2009): 86.  
6 Judt, Reappraisals, 8. 
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nineteenth century than the product of twentieth century idealism. The 
New Deal developed the Welfare State in the U.S. The Welfare State was 
constructed “not as an advanced guard of egalitarian revolution but to 
provide a barrier against the return of the past: against economic depression 
and its polarizing, violent political outcome in the desperate politics of 
Fascism and Communism alike. The welfare states were thus prophylactic 
states.” These states worked well. They provided a half century of 
prosperity and security. But the result is that “we in the West have 
forgotten the political and social traumas of mass insecurity. And thus we 
have forgotten why we have inherited those welfare states and what 
brought them about.”7   
The loss of our historical memory, and the absence—or 
forgetfulness— of the past in our public discourses, willful or not, has led 
to our personal and political fragmentation. Until the Great Recession, and 
yet still today, the very prosperity and security afforded by the welfare states 
in the U.K. and the U.S., have been taken for granted by the younger 
generations. Largely lacking the knowledge which brought those welfare 
states about, and which made their own prosperity possible, they have 
become increasingly resentful of a taxing and regulating state imposing itself 
on them. This is especially true when it appears the state is reducing their 
own standard of living by imposing taxes which seem to benefit others; and 
when the opportunities once opened up by the state are increasingly closed 
off by a shrinking state and a shrinking public sector that can no longer 
provide benefits once available in the past.   
We did not always live this way, nor can we afford to any longer. For 
the better part of a century, from the last decades of the nineteenth century 
until the 1970‟s, the inequalities that have formed since the 1970‟s—which 
to younger generations appears to be part of the natural order of things—
were constantly being flattened out by progressive taxation, government 
subsidies to the poor through welfare programs, and social services that 
were available as prophylactic against personal misfortunes. And what was 
true of the U.S. with its regulated capitalism and the New Deal of Franklin 
Roosevelt, with its numerous public works programs and government 
subsidies, was even more true of many nations in Europe. There was first 
of all the welfare state of Great Britain with socialized medicine, state 
subsidized pensions and the nationalization and subsidization of key 
enterprises such as the national railways; and the social democracies of 
Scandinavia—which Tony Judt calls nanny states—which have provided 
social guarantees for every member of the population from the cradle to the 
grave, subsidized medical systems and public transportation and housing. 
And finally Germany, which has had a managed capitalist society combined 
with a welfare state since the era of Bismarck in the nineteenth-century. All 
these European countries have several things in common: they all require 
deep taxation, but make an equivalent public provision; and second, 
nowhere has the public rebelled against steep taxes. Why? They know that 
all levels of society are the beneficiaries of the system that is in place 
because all have in effect prepaid for their mutual health, physical security 
and comfort. In effect, they believe it is better to pay up front for social 
guarantees, than to play roulette with health, housing and well-being in the 
future.   
                                                          
7 Ibid, 10. 
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In 1989 I came into Soviet Union and understood immediately that a 
political discourse which had evolved for some two hundred years was 
coming to an end. To cite Fukuyama again, one kind of history was ending. 
Yet it became self-evident that it had already ended. The Age of Ideology 
had ended, and Utopia was no more. But this was true in an ironic sense as 
well. When I was a student in the Sixties—the 1960‟s—many students 
engaged in passionate debates about what they thought the public good 
was. There was rarely agreement, but the point was that students were 
studying political philosophy and wanted desperately to understand the 
meaning of a public good, and then to become engaged in achieving it. For 
many of us, political and moral philosophy—what was just, what was fair—
engaged most of our waking thoughts. Few if any—in some student 
circles—would have been willing to agree that the public good should be 
second to achieving a more economically efficient market—or would have 
agreed that the latter was necessarily more efficient—witness the Great 
Recession of 2008.  
What is missing today, and what has been absent for decades, is a sense 
of trust, a conviction of community, and belief in a common purpose. We 
have gone from what President Johnson called “a nation of nations” to a 
nation of families and individuals, such as depicted by Margaret Thatcher. 
Not having a common purpose, and no longer believing in anything like 
social equality, we are wont to stigmatize what we now think of as the 
“Other.” This label has especially been attached to the poor; the Great 
Recession may have taught us a lesson, that we could quickly and 
permanently become the Other, or be counted among the poor by little 
more than a twist of fate or the collapse of the market.  
This was not always so. Writing in the eighteenth century, building the 
edifice of the „freed‟ market as the basis of the wealth of nations, opposed 
to the monopolists of his day, Adam Smith counseled something quite 
different: “To feel much for others and little for ourselves; to restrain our 
selfishness and exercise our benevolent affections, constitute the perfection 
of human nature.”8 From the beginning, Smith admonished against the 
uncritical pursuit of wealth, a destructive force, he argued, that could well 
undermine what capitalism needed to flourish. Smith sounded an early 
warning, and an urgent appeal, not to divide ourselves into rich and poor, at 
the very least, not to ignore or despise the poor: “The disposition to admire, 
and almost to worship, the rich, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect, 
persons of poor and mean condition . . . [is] . . . the great and most 
universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.”9  
For Adam Smith the moral economy took precedence over the market 
economy. Smith was hardly alone in counseling that putting social well-
being ahead of private interest was the best way to preserve the public 
health and human happiness. John Stuart Mill, writing in mid-nineteenth-
century, feared the destructive powers of self-interest unbound by an 
unregulated market: “The idea is essentially repulsive, of a society held 
                                                          
8 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York: Penguin Books, 
2009), 31. 
9  Ibid., 73. 
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together only by the relations and feelings arising out of pecuniary 
interests.”10  
Alexis de Tocqueville, a keen observer of America, which he admired— 
in the nineteenth century—aristocratic by birth, democratic by sentiment, 
and a lover of liberty, thought that American democracy could only be 
fulfilled if liberty was abetted by equality. He warned against the emergence 
of a new elite, or a new aristocracy; equality and liberty were not only 
compatible, both were necessary for the happiness of human beings. His 
opening passages in Democracy in America , written shortly after his visit to 
America in 1831, made this clear:  
 
Of all the novel things which attracted my attention during 
my stay in the United States, none struck me more forcibly 
than the equality of social conditions. I had no difficulty in 
discovering the extraordinary influence this fundamental 
fact exerts upon the progress of society; it sets up a 
particular direction to public attitudes, a certain style to the 
laws, fresh guidelines to governing authorities, and 
individual habits to those governed. 
Soon I came to recognize that this very fact extends its 
influence well beyond political customs and laws; it 
exercises no less power over civil society than it does over 
the government. It forms opinion, creates feelings, 
proposes ways of acting, and transforms anything it does 
not directly instigate itself. 
 
Consequently, as I studied American society, I increasingly 
viewed this equality of social conditions as the factor 
which generated all the others and I discovered that it 
represented a central focus in which all my observations 
constantly ended.11  
 
Much as Tocqueville admired American democracy, he was not necessarily 
sanguine about its future. He noted that in America there was an absence of 
a governing class that governed dispassionately in the name of the public 
interest. Instead he observed an industrial class, possessed of talent and 
ingenuity to be sure, but also a class that was readily transforming its money 
into popularity, influence and power. Tocqueville warned against a new 
aristocracy of wealth, with no standards other than self-aggrandizement. 
There was an antidote to this, however; the maintenance of conditions of 
social equality.12  
Tocqueville was one of the earliest to notice the strength of civic life in 
the United States. What was the cause of an active civic life? For 
                                                          
10 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their 
Applications to Social Philosophy, ed. Stephen Nathanson (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 2004), 193. 
11 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Gerald R. Bevan 
(London: Penguin Books, 2003),   11. 
12 Jack Luzkow, The Revenge of History: Why the Past Endures—A Critique of 
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Tocqueville it was the discovery of a common interest, which could only 
occur under conditions of social equality:  
 
When all men . . . are ranked in an irrevocable way 
according to their occupation, wealth, and birth . . . each 
caste has its opinions, its sentiments, its rights, its moral 
habits, its separate existence. Thus the men who compose 
it bear no resemblance to any of the others, they do not 
have the same way of thinking or of feeling, and if they 
believe themselves to belong to the same humanity, they 
do so just barely.13    
 
Simultaneously, he added: 
 
When ranks are almost equal among a people, with all men 
having more or less the same manner of thinking and 
feeling, each of them can judge in an instant the feelings of 
all the others: he cats a rapid glance at himself; that suffices 
for him. There is thus no misery that he cannot easily 
conceive of and whose dimensions are not revealed to him 
by a secret instinct. It does not matter whether it is a 
question of strangers or enemies: his imagination puts him 
immediately in their place. It mixes something personal 
into his pity and makes him suffer himself when the body 
of his fellow man is torn apart.14    
 
Tocqueville completed this sentiment by declaring that “the same man who 
is full of humanity for his fellow men when they are at the same time his 
equals becomes insensitive to their sufferings the moment the equality 
ceases.”15 
What Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville all had 
in common was the conviction that human happiness depended upon the 
building of community, the extension of mutual trust, and the defining of a 
common purpose. Without quite expressing themselves in the language of 
modernity, they had expressed the sentiments that were the foundation for 
modern social democracy: this implied not only feeling much for others, it 
meant trusting others, and it meant ultimately not only conceding initiative 
to a public sector, but also embracing a common purpose by conceding 
private wealth to the pursuit of collective goals.  
The notions of collective goals, common purposes, an interventionist 
state that regulated the market through progressive taxation, social and 
economic planning, and commitment to public welfare, were all 
prescriptions for the building and pursuit of mutual trust, all  were 
fundamentals that were needed if there was to be a public purpose. It was a 
given that this could only occur when people had much in common with 
each other: and this implied a commonality not only of religion or of 
language, it also implied a relative leveling of income and wealth. The more 
                                                          
13 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Stephen D. Grant 
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000), 249.  
14  Ibid., 251. 
15  Ibid. 
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equal a society, the greater the trust. The matter, however, went beyond 
income. If people had similar lives and similar prospects or life chances, 
then they were more likely to have not only a shared moral outlook, but a 
shared common purpose. This in fact has been the basis of „radical‟ 
departures in the solving of social problems. When people are less equal, 
politics becomes more contentious, and it becomes more difficult to define 
a common purpose.16   
Public planning did not by definition imply public ownership. It is not a 
given that the state is more competent than the private sector, or that it has 
less shortcomings than the market. On the other hand, it was also widely 
believed in a number of countries, even before World War I and 
increasingly afterwards, that the free market could be compatible with social 
goals and welfare legislation. Banks and corporations could be required to 
take a long view, including even listening to their employees and becoming 
conscious of the social consequences of their businesses, and yet remain 
highly profitable.17 Nor did high progressive taxation have to be an affront; 
even prior to the First World War income taxes were often quite steep. But 
the income tax, no matter how steep, was widely seen as a consensual 
device to take unneeded and excess resources from the privileged and put 
them at the disposal of those who needed them the most. The point is that 
among the general population a moderate redistribution was widely 
embraced; eliminating the extremes of wealth and poverty was seen as 
benefitting all.  Moreover, in the context of European politics, especially 
before and after World War II, it became quite clear what the benefits of 
cooperation, progressive taxation and the interventionist state were: they 
included security, prosperity, social services, and greater equality, all firmly 
embedded in mutual trust.18  
A generation after WW II,  beginning in the 1980‟s, the U.S. went 
through sea changes; taxes were dramatically reduced, private fortunes 
accelerated to a level previously unprecedented, income and wealth 
inequalities grew to new heights, and people‟s overall happiness sank with 
the loss of their homes, their jobs, and too often their health.  
What had brought about these momentous changes? Just as we have 
forgotten why so many men and women once fought for Utopia, or 
struggled to improve their lives through revolution, or simply dropped out 
of society to live in communes, just as we have forgotten the way our 
ancestors have struggled, and formed the kind of social institutions to help 
stave off the insecurities of poverty and depression, so have we forgotten 
why we built in social safeguards against the perils of the unregulated 
market. To put it bluntly, we are not sure why we think the market can 
solve all social ills; we may not even be certain why we slavishly follow the 
adulation of wealth, or that we are slavishly pursuing it.  
Once again, we have forgotten how we got here. In the 1980‟s, the 
„Chicago boys‟ as they have been called, led by Milton Friedman, not only 
abandoned the admonitions of Smith, Tocqueville and Mill, they presumed 
that the only way to build the wealth of nations was to liberate the market 
from all constraints, a feat that has falsely been attributed to Smith, who 
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actually feared the destructive powers of the so-called liberated market. 
Contemporaries think that the provenance for this „newthink‟ should be 
attributed to Milton Friedman and the Chicago school. Indeed they have 
made their mark, but the origins go back to the Vienna school of 
economists and political thinkers of the decades following the First World 
War.  
The Vienna school included Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Karl 
Popper, Peter Drucker, and Joseph Schumpeter; together they were the 
ancestors of the Chicago school. Von Mises and Hayek were the true 
advocates of free-market economics, while Schumpeter staunchly defended 
the creative—and destructive— powers of capitalism. Popper defended the 
open society, while Peter Drucker wrote about the theory and practice of 
management in the decades following World War II. All were born in 
Vienna, or in its environs, and all were severely impacted by the destruction 
of their native Austria during the interwar period.19 After World War I, and 
a brief socialist municipal experiment in Vienna, Austria, fell to a 
reactionary coup in 1934, and four years later succumbed to Nazi invasion 
and occupation. Following these events, the young economists were forced 
into exile. As a result, they were to cast their writings under the pall of these 
events, beginning with the question: why had liberal Austria collapsed and 
embraced fascism?  
Popper‟s answer, shared by the others, was that the tragedy had ensued 
from the failure of the (Marxist) Left to successfully introduce into post-
1918 Austria a system of state-directed planning, and collectivized 
economic activity that included municipal ownership. This failure had 
produced a counter-reaction, that of the fascists. Thus, it was the indecision 
of the Left, which was itself a result of its faith in historical laws and human 
reason, which had allowed for the more energetic fascists, having no such 
faith in human reason or historical laws, to conquer power.20  
Hayek shared these conclusions, it was the inability of the Left to act 
that had led to the collapse of Austria. He also blamed Liberals for failing to 
resist the challenge of the Right and the Fascists. The question then 
became: how best to withstand the challenges from the Right in the future? 
Each of the members of the Viennese school arrived at the same 
conclusion: the best way to defend Liberalism in the future was to defend 
the “open society,” and to keep the state out of economic affairs. To 
protect the freedoms of the citizenry, it was necessary to keep the state at a 
safe distance, to prevent it from planning, manipulating, and otherwise 
directing the affairs of fellow citizens. If this could be done, then the 
extremists of the Right and the Left would be excluded from power. Society 
would indeed be free. That it might also be unequal, and that this might 
make it less free, was not a concern.21 
After WW II, Hayek, who was by then living in England and teaching 
at the London School of Economics, predicted that a victory for the Labor 
Party, which had already proclaimed the welfare state as its objective, would 
mean that Britain would share the same fate as the Austrian precedent: 
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Britain would experience a revival of fascism. The Labor Party did indeed 
win, but its victory heralded postwar stability and put Britain on the road 
toward postwar prosperity as well, not fascism.  
This was precisely what John Maynard Keynes had foreseen. Keynes 
thought, with the examples of Depression and World War I behind him, 
that economic collapse and a return to political extremism could only be 
forestalled by increasing the role of the state. Unlike the Austrian political and 
intellectual refugees, all of whom despised any collective categories of 
thought, such as social goods and economic planning, the Keynesian notion 
of the need for state planning of the economy was widely embraced in 
Hayek‟s new home.  The British—especially after the experiences behind 
them—were hardly about to give up what became the British version of the 
nanny state, which included among other things free medical care and 
subsidized higher education.22  
Keynes had simply taken another page from history than had the 
Austrian economists; he became the intellectual inspiration of the New 
Deal in the United States and the modern welfare state—or something that 
approached that—in Britain. The crash of 1929 created a consensus among 
most economists that the unregulated market had failed, and that 
governments had to intervene to redistribute wealth and regulate 
corporations. Faced with the challenge of Communism in the East, and the 
known failures of laissez-faire economics, the welfare state was embraced 
widely after World War II, and became the dominant policy creed of 
Western Europe.23  
The idea of the welfare state was nothing new. Its provenance can be 
traced to the 1880‟s in Germany, and to turn-of-the-century England. 
Socialists like Beatrice Webb took for granted early on that there should be 
public provision for education, health services and medical insurance, 
public parks and playgrounds, public provision for the aged and the infirm. 
For Webb, this was a simple moral economy, as it would be for E. P. 
Thompson and others decades later. The lesson drawn by Beatrice Webb 
was simple: people should cooperate, they should work together for the 
common good, and nobody should be left out.24 This was the creed 
articulated and embraced by Keynes and his followers in postwar Europe; 
nor did it apply only to economics and economic stabilization. Keynes 
labored also to elevate the cultural level of the British: an educated and 
knowledgeable people would make better citizens, and the country as a 
whole would embrace better and more enlightened policies. 
What was novel in all this was not the idea of a moral economy, “but 
the thought that such things were best done by the government, and 
therefore they should be done by the government.”25 How this was done was 
contentious in Britain, universalists wanted a comprehensive system in 
which there would be high across-the-board taxation to pay for services 
that would be available for all. The Scandinavian welfare states didn‟t 
tamper with the private sector in the economy, but they taxed at a high rate 
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which enabled them to pay for social and cultural services which were then 
made freely available for all. The objective of Scandinavia was not collective 
ownership, it was collective protection.26  
Continental European welfare states, or providential states, followed 
yet another model: they emphasized—as Germany in particular still does— 
the employed citizen against the debilitating effects of the market economy. 
In France, West Germany, and Italy the emphasis was on maintaining good 
jobs and incomes even in times of economic misfortune. This was typical 
Keynesianism: people who worked could buy, making it possible for people 
who produced, to sell.  Unlike the contemporary policies embraced in the 
U.S. and Great Britain, which have done nothing to relieve the stress of 
growing unemployment, and which have failed to protect jobs, the 
European perspective questioned the wisdom of throwing a growing army 
of the unemployed onto the street in a time of economic recession; this, 
they argued, was more disastrous than the so-called efficiency gained by 
eliminating hypothetically unnecessary jobs.27 
Given that welfare states, social democracies, social protection, and the 
social security state worked for decades, how then did we arrive at the 
Great Recession of 2008? What was the road that took us from the Great 
Society of Lyndon Johnson to the “no society” of Lady Margaret Thatcher 
and laissez-faire advocate Ronald Reagan? What caused the shift, certainly in 
Britain and the U.S., away from public proclamation of the collective good, 
toward the worship of the private sector and its accompanying cult of 
privatization? One answer was that in an age of budgetary restraints, the 
privatization of public goods saved the public monies, sometimes 
dramatically so. The state either owned inefficient operations, which should 
be closed or sold off, or the state was itself inefficient, in which case the 
goods it owned should be privatized; that this was so owed to the economic 
theories of the Chicago „boys‟, who were convinced that privatization 
meant duly restoring an inefficient factory to private ownership; it would by 
definition become more efficient by returning it to competition because of 
the profit motive. This then was the underpinning of the Chicago school, 
which saw its opportunity beginning in the 1980‟s.  
It was in this period that, once again, the theories of the Austrians came 
into vogue: their successors were led by Milton Friedman, economics 
professor at the University of Chicago, and a longtime devotee of the 
unfettered market, by which he meant getting rid of government regulation, 
trade barriers, and entrenched interests, including the labor movement and 
labor unions. Cleansed of all these so-called barriers and tamperings, the 
economy could be returned to a state of pure capitalism. Supported by this 
theory, the dismantling of the welfare state began, at least in the United 
States and, to a lesser extent, in Britain, where even political conservatives 
were unwilling to challenge or to withdraw free medical services, a sure 
recipe for political suicide. 
Since the 1980‟s Milton Friedman‟s theories have reigned as the 
orthodox ideas governing not only the policies of the U.S., and in Britain, 
but they have become embedded as the official philosophy of the 
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International Monetary Fund, which has attempted to impose them on less 
developed countries, or countries in crisis, when they have come to the 
West with outstretched hands. Back in the twentieth century Friedman had 
dreamed—though he had long been ignored—of returning to a pristine 
state of pure market capitalism, with no entrenched interests or government 
policies to „distort‟ the market. The core of the Chicago school philosophy 
was that, in the truly free market, the economic forces of supply, demand, 
inflation, and unemployment were in perfect equilibrium; in fact, Friedman 
and his colleagues saw these as forces of nature, operating in the same 
manner as physical laws. If an economy suffered from inflation, it was 
because of the misguided policy of putting too much money into the 
economy, rather than allowing the market to find its own equilibrium. Left 
to its own devices the market would create the right number of products, at 
the right prices, produced by workers at precisely the correct wages, 
enabling them to buy the products they had produced. Given this balancing 
of forces, there should be no inflation, nor should there be any shortage of 
employment.28   
Friedman, however, preached his doctrine in the wilderness for 
decades, after all how could he test his assumptions? Since all economies 
seemed out of balance, it had to be assumed that they were all somehow 
distorted. Scientists could test their theories under controlled conditions in 
laboratories. Friedman could not identify any living economy which, 
stripped of all distortions, would be in perfect and rapturous health.  
Like all fundamentalist faiths, no matter how much Friedman tried to 
base his theories on the principles of „science‟, his system was a perfect 
circle. If one assumed that the free market operated like a scientific system, 
a system in which individuals, acting for their own self-interested desires, 
created benefits for all, then the presence of any problems, whether high 
inflation or high levels of unemployment, could only mean that the market 
was not truly free.29 
Was Friedman wrong in arguing that the unprecedented global 
prosperity in the last decades of the twentieth century was because of free 
markets, free prices, consumer choice, and economic liberty? On the 
contrary, there was much truth in this argument, but not in the way that 
Friedman had intended. This was because the nature of global prosperity, 
who shared in it, who didn‟t, and where the new wealth came from, were 
still hotly debated. “What is irrefutable,” says Naomi Klein, “is the fact that 
Friedman‟s free market rulebook, and his savvy strategies for imposing it . . 
. made some people extremely prosperous, winning for them something 
approximating complete freedom—to ignore national borders, to avoid 
regulation and taxation and to amass new wealth.”30   
Friedman‟s personal experience as a child seemed ill-fitted to his claims 
to wear the liberty cap. In his early childhood, he moved with his parents, 
both Hungarian immigrants, to Rahway, New Jersey, where his parents 
bought a garment factory. The business, located in the same building as the 
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family‟s apartment, would later be recalled by Friedman, in lectures and 
television appearances, in highly rapturous terms. Yet in Friedman‟s 
memoirs, Two Lucky People, he admitted that, in contemporary 
understanding, the business would be called a sweatshop.31  
Friedman‟s ideas thus did not appear out of a vacuum. From the 
perspective of a sweatshop owner, the world was a dangerous and unfair 
place. The interwar era was indeed volatile, with Marxists, radicals, 
anarchists all organizing workers into unions and demanding better working 
conditions and higher wages, and even debating the theory of worker 
ownership, all threats, no doubt, to Friedman‟s parents, and later to 
Friedman himself. Friedman knew quite well that a sweat shop is a sweat 
shop by any name, yet in those same television appearances he offered his 
parents‟ factory as an example of the benefits of deregulated capitalism, 
proof that even the worst and least regulated shop floors still offered 
opportunities—especially for immigrants—to reach freedom and 
prosperity.32  
It was the ideological divide of the Cold War that made it possible for 
Friedman‟s ideas to gain traction. As the politics of the Left, including more 
power to the workers, gained popularity globally, an opportunity presented 
itself to the Chicago school to defend the interests of owners; more than 
that, to defend those interests in a way that was also radical, and at the same 
time idealistic. Friedman himself had a magic wand; he was not, he insisted, 
defending the interests of factory owners to pay low wages, he was rather in 
pursuit of the purest form of “participatory democracy.” This was because 
in the free market each man could vote with the freedom to choose 
whatever he wanted to consume. Freedom of choice in the market implied 
democratic choice.33 Leftists could offer freedom of “workers from bosses, 
citizens from dictatorship [and] countries from colonialism.”34 Friedman, 
on the contrary, promised “individual freedom,” thereby liberating the 
individual from any collective enterprise and allowing him to express his 
absolute free will through consumer choice. Just as Marxism offered 
“idealism combined with radicalism,” so now, recalled economist Don 
Patinkin, Friedman offered the same recipe for entrepreneurs.35 In this way, 
Friedman defined the entrepreneurial utopia of the future. The enemy, 
however, was not Marxist idealism, or ideology, it was Keynes and the 
challenge to the unregulated market. The problem was therefore not how to 
create capitalism, but how to restore it to its pristine, and unregulated, state. 
Thirty years on, Friedman had succeeded even in ways he—decorated with 
a Nobel prize—could never have foreseen. In pressing toward the kind of 
liberty he sought, Friedman had forgotten history, and the reasons why 
Keynes had sought to use the state to elevate the citizen, as well as to 
lubricate the economy: the reason was simple, Keynes wanted to avert the 
kind of ideological ugliness that followed World War I, and relying on the 
state to define and pursue a common purpose was the only way forward.  
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Where are we today, three decades after the ideas of Friedman were 
institutionalized, especially in the United States? Robert Reich, former 
Secretary of Labor, has shared his perspective: “Most American families are 
worse off today than they were three decades ago. The Great Recession of 
2008-2009 destroyed the value of their homes, undermined their savings, 
and too often left them without jobs. But even before the Great Recession 
began, most Americans had gained little from the economic expansion that 
began almost three decades before. Today, the Great Recession 
notwithstanding, the U.S. economy is far larger than it was in 1980. But 
where has all the wealth gone? Mostly to the top. The data shows that by 
2007, America‟s top 1 percent of earners received 23 percent of the nation‟s 
total income—almost triple their 8 percent share in 1980.”36  
These figures become even more extreme when we examine the 
distribution of wealth in the U.S. Consider net worth first—in 1983 the top 
1 percent of the U.S. population owned 33.8 percent of U.S. total net 
worth. In 2007 the top 1 percent owned about the same, 34.6 percent of 
total net worth. The same year, the bottom 80 percent of the U.S. 
population owned 15 percent of net worth, a decline of 3.7 percent since 
1983. The picture worsens when we consider financial wealth in the US. In 
2007 the top 1 percent of American households owned 42.7 percent of the 
financial wealth, and the bottom 80 percent controlled 7 percent. According 
to G. William Domhoff, the effect of the Great Recession has increased 
social inequalities even more. Based on the price of housing and stock in 
July 2009, he concluded that there had been a 36.1 percent drop in the 
wealth (marketable assets) of the median household since the peak of the 
housing bubble in 2007. By contrast the wealth of the top 1 percent of 
households had dropped far less, by 11.1 percent.37 Going by the latest 
figures we have, the United States is one of the most socially unequal 
nations in the world. 
The unequal distribution of income is a dramatic story, but the 
inequalities of wealth, not income, tell the most dramatic story in America. 
In addition to the 34.6 percent of wealth owned by the wealthiest 1 percent 
of the population in 2007, the next 19 percent of the population, the 
managerial, professional, and small business stratum, owned 50.5 percent of 
the wealth. That meant that just 20 percent of the population in the United 
States in 2007 owned 85 percent of the total wealth of all Americans. Put 
another way, 80 percent of the US population owned only 15 percent of 
American wealth. In sum, wealth in America has become ever more 
concentrated.38  
Consider executive pay, as Robert Reich does in his Preface to The 
Spirit Level by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, two British researchers. 
In the decades of the 1950‟s and 1960‟s, CEO‟s of major American 
corporations took home about 25 to 30 times the wages of the typical 
worker in the same decades. Then a dramatic divergence began in the 
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1970,s; by 2007, just prior to the financial meltdown in the U.S., average 
CEO pay ballooned to about 350 times what the average worker earned. In 
what was probably the most extreme example, the CEO of Wal-Mart took 
home 900 times the pay and benefits of the typical Wal-Mart worker. 
Moreover, the wealth of the Wal-Mart family in 2005 was estimated at $90 
billion, the same as the bottom 40 percent of the US population for that 
year, some 120 million people.39  
In an age of deregulation, America has generated unequalled wealth, 
but the vast majority of that wealth has gone straight to the top, as Reich 
indicated, and at precisely the same time that Americans have lost their 
homes, jobs, and possessions at rates unprecedented since the Great 
Depression.    
Today, as in the U.S., the Great Britain is more unequal in incomes, 
wealth, health, education, and life chances than at any period since the 
1920‟s. Today the poor stay poor. The symptoms of their poverty, the 
direct result of inequality according to British researchers Wilkinson and 
Kate Pickett, translate into ill health, low educational achievement, and 
social symptoms like alcoholism, obesity, mental illness and gambling. 
Inequality is not just unattractive, it is the leading cause of a number of 
social pathologies that include high infant mortality, low life expectancy, 
high rates of criminality, including homicide, imprisonment, mental illness, 
unemployment, obesity, malnutrition, teenage pregnancy, illegal drug use, 
economic insecurity, poor children‟s educational performance, personal 
indebtedness and anxiety. Inequality, so much more marked in the U.S. and 
Britain than in continental Europe, has a high social cost. It is the direct link 
to misery and unhappiness.40 
Today, it is generally agreed that the wider the gap between the wealthy 
few and the struggling many, the worse the social problems: and this 
appears to be true for rich and poor countries alike. What matters is not 
how affluent a country is but how unequal it is. Both Sweden and Finland 
are wealthy by per capita income and GDP, have a narrow gap separating 
the richest from the poorest citizens and consistently lead the world in 
“indices of measurable well-being.”41 At the other end of the spectrum is 
the U.S., which has a huge aggregate wealth, but is always low on such 
measures. The U.S. spends vast sums on health, but life expectancy in the 
U.S. remains below that of Bosnia and just above Albania. Japan, which 
spends far less on health care, tops the scale of life expectancy at almost 82 
while the U.S. lingers between 76 and 78.42  
Wilkinson and Pickett have discovered that intergenerational mobility 
has virtually collapsed in both the U.S. and Britain, and for much the same 
reason: children in these countries cannot expect to have the same life styles 
and affluence as their parents, reflecting the large income inequalities in 
these two countries. The American Dream is fast disappearing; the U.S. has 
the lowest social mobility and the highest income disparities of the eight 
countries that Wilkinson and Pickett compare. On a chart comparing 
income inequality and social mobility, the Scandinavian social democracies, 
Sweden, Norway and Finland, and Denmark, and Germany and Canada, 
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with many of the characteristics of a social democracy, are considerably 
ahead of both Britain and U.S. in income equality, social mobility and 
measurable well-being.43  
What has produced these kinds of income and wealth disparities that 
have become not only widespread in the US, but which are increasingly 
becoming globalized? Some commentators blame, not corporate greed, or 
the intractability of Wall Street, or even the docility of investors, but the 
globalization of the economy; it has in fact changed the way we do 
business, and has increased the ever growing need to become competitive. 
Until the last two decades, corporate executives had to maintain the 
goodwill of organized labor; they had to preserve good relations with public 
officials who had the power to set wages and prices, and they needed 
regulatory permissions on fares, rates and licenses. They needed good 
relations because they wanted government contracts.  
So what has changed? Competition, for one, has become more intense 
than ever: 
 
1. Corporations now can gain access to low-cost suppliers from all 
parts of the globe.   
2. They can streamline operations with information technology. 
3. They can cut the labor force and substitute similar software. 
4. They can outsource hourly jobs abroad.44 
 
But of course inequality is not the result of globalization, the payscales of 
CEO‟s are the result of corporate decisions that have little or nothing to do 
with globalization. The divergence  between CEO pay and worker pay in 
Europe has remained much steadier for decades, and more resembles the 
U.S. some three decades ago than the U.S. today, though Europe must 
compete in the same global environment. And of course tax structures also 
have nothing to do with the market as such, they are the result of national 
domestic decisions as to how generated wealth should be used; and how it 
should be taxed. In Europe, in the social democracies, higher taxes equate 
with much greater equality, and greater equality has led to much happier 
nations.  
Despite patent inequality, and the social pathologies we know that it 
creates, few philosophers (ethicists) or even economists have studied the 
social costs of inequality. Some of those who have, concluded that 
redistribution is warranted on purely utilitarian grounds because it would 
increase the greatest good of the greatest number.  
Even fewer politicians have sought a redistribution of wealth in any 
form. When Barack Obama proposed an increase in income taxes—an 
extremely modest increase, before and since his presidency, he was opposed 
on both sides of the congressional aisle.  
What are the results of inequality in the U.S.? A recent poll reported on 
NBC‟s evening news noted the attitudes of Americans to their country: 
more than 60 percent reported that they thought the U.S. was in decline; 
about the same percentage didn‟t expect to ever get back to the standard of 
living they had known before the Great Recession; and just as many 
thought their children would not be able to enjoy the standard of living they 
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had once known. In sum, the vast majority of Americans regretted the loss 
of what we might call the social contract. They believed themselves to be 
acting in a vacuum, with no confidence in their government or their future. 
Richard Wilkinson has given us a vivid description of the social ennui and 
social pathologies experienced by these same Americans (and by the 
British): 
 
It is a remarkable paradox that, at the pinnacle of human 
material and technical development, we find ourselves 
anxiety-ridden, prone to depression, worried about how 
others see us, unsure of our friendships, driven to 
consume and with little or no community life. Lacking the 
relaxed social contract and emotional satisfaction we all 
need, we seek comfort in over-eating, obsessive shopping 
and spending, or become prey to excessive alcohol, 
psychoactive medicines and illegal drugs.45 
 
A study commissioned by the Harwood Institute for Public Innovation in 
the U.S. found that a large majority of Americans thought that materialism 
and greed had somehow become all pervasive; Americans wanted to move 
toward a society and a life more centered on values, family and community. 
Yet they also thought that these values were not held by a majority of 
Americans, whom they thought had become atomized, selfish and 
irresponsible. As a result they felt isolated and lonely. And also, no doubt, 
they were hardly aware of political and social alternatives, and how to 
achieve them.  America, the land of unparalleled material success, was also 
the land of unparalleled social pathologies, a nation increasingly unhappy 
and unequal. Society apparently was broken, and this long before the Great 
Recession. Yet this was not the inevitable result of modernity, globalization 
and the technological revolution. Social democracies in Europe have made 
different social choices, with different social results; and they are happier 
for having done so.46 
The United States is an affluent nation by any standards. The average 
income per person in the U.S. is about $38, 000. That is higher than any 
other nation in the world. Only Norway comes close at about $37,500. 
Japan, Sweden, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, the G.B., 
Finland and Israel, all have an income per capita below $30,000. Yet of the 
23 wealthiest countries in the world—as measured by individual income—
the United States ranks higher than only three nations, Portugal, Ireland and 
Denmark, in life expectancy.47  
Tony Judt, writing in the New York Review of Books, observed the 
following: “Something is profoundly wrong with the way we live today. For 
thirty years we have made a virtue of the pursuit of material self-interest: 
indeed this very pursuit now constitutes whatever remains of our sense of 
collective purpose. We know what things cost, but have no idea what they 
are worth.”48   
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As Judt went on to suggest, and as many of us know, the materialistic 
and selfish quality of contemporary life is not an inherent part of the human 
condition. Much of what we take for granted today has its origins in the 
1980‟s; “the obsession with wealth creation, the cult of privatization and the 
private sector, the growing disparities of rich and poor. And above all, the 
rhetoric that accompanies these: uncritical admiration for unfettered 
markets, disdain for the public sector, the delusion of endless growth.”49 
The Great Crash of 2008 was a reminder that we cannot continue like this; 
unregulated capitalism has a nasty habit of excess that leads to collapse. 
And with the usual outcome; those who caused the collapse standing in line 
for handouts from the same state they had weakened and whose regulation 
they had successfully avoided.   
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